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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze the growth effects of fiscal
policy in Bolivia. It is a multi-sector model with five representative sectors for the Bolivian economy: Non-tradables,
importables, hydrocarbons, mining and agriculture. Public capital is included as a production factor in each of these
sectors. The model is calibrated and a number of interesting scenarios are simulated by modifying each of the available
fiscal policy instruments. In particular, we analyze the sustainability of Bolivian social policy based on government
transfers to households along with the short- and long-run implications of fiscal policy for growth and welfare. We
find that fiscal policy alone is unable to generate high rates of growth: it must be accompanied by an efficient provision
of public capital and productivity boosts in the economic sectors.
Palabras clave: Fiscal Policy, Infrastructure, Multi-sector growth model
Resumen
En este trabajo se desarrolla un modelo de equilibrio general dinámico estocástico (DSGE) para analizar los efectos
de la política fiscal en el crecimiento de Bolivia. Se trata de un modelo multisectorial con cinco sectores representativos
de la economía boliviana: no transables importables, hidrocarburos, minería y agricultura. Además, se incluye capital
público como un factor de producción en cada uno de estos sectores. El modelo está calibrado y se simulan una serie de
interesantes escenarios modificando cada uno de los distintos instrumentos disponibles de política fiscal. En particular,
se analiza la sostenibilidad de la política social basada en transferencias directas del gobierno a los hogares junto con las
implicaciones a corto y largo plazo de la política fiscal para el crecimiento y el bienestar. Se encuentra que la política fiscal
por sí sola no es capaz de generar altas tasas de crecimiento, debe ir acompañada de una provisión eficiente de capital
público (infraestructura) y de incrementos en la productividad de los sectores económicos.
Keywords: Política fiscal, infraestructura, modelo de crecimiento multisectorial.
Código JEL: E62, H54, O41.
1 Introduction
The early 1990s saw a boom in economic literature an-
alyzing expansionary fiscal policies based on tax cuts or
spending increases. Much of this body of research aimed
to analyze fiscal adjustments in contexts of economic cri-
sis. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were the first to argue that
decisive deficit reductions through spending cuts could be
expansionary via effects on private consumption. Alesina
and Perotti (1997) investigate various cases of fiscal ad-
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justment and conclude that fiscal stimuli through tax cuts
are more likely to increase growth than those based upon
spending increases.1
A recent revival of this literature in developed coun-
tries, particularly in the United States, has been stoked by
the 2007-2009financial crisis and the fiscal policy responses
that have been the basis of many of the recovery policies.
Feldstein (2009) indicates that, despite a recent general con-
sensus among economists that fiscal policy was not an ef-
fective countercyclical instrument, governments in Wash-
ington and around the world are now developing mas-
sive fiscal stimulus packages, supported by a wide range
of economists in universities, governments and businesses.
There has been a revival of the use of so-called fiscal policy
multipliers.2
In Latin America and other developing countries, re-
cent literature has mainly sought to verify the idea that fis-
cal policy is procyclical, a puzzle that has sparked a grow-
ing theoretical literature in an effort to explain this ten-
dency. Gavin and Perotti (1997) were the first to draw
attention to the fact, while Talvi and Vegh (2005) claimed
that procyclical fiscal policy seemed to be the general rule
across the developing world. Recently, Ilzetzki and Vegh
(2008) find overwhelming evidence, using a battery of
econometric tests, to support the idea that fiscal policy in
developing countries is in fact procyclical.
A common feature in this literature is the focus on
tax and expenditure policies to the exclusion of analysis
of public investment policies, particularly those which in-
volve public infrastructure investments. As shown by As-
chauer (1989a, 1989b), infrastructure is an important source
of growth. These works concentrated on estimating the
production elasticities of government expenditures using
aggregated data, mainly for the United States3. Cross-
country studies have also highlighted the role of infrastruc-
ture for a country’s growth.4
Papers in this literature have typically used regression
analysis on either growth accounting or on steady-state
equations. While these papers have been useful in pointing
out the importance of infrastructure, their methodologies
do not allow for analysis of important general equilibrium
feedback effects among key macroeconomic variables and
welfare.
It is in this context that this study examines the impact
of fiscal policy on output, consumption, investment and
foreign trade using a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) model for a small open economy with five
sectors and with the novel feature that firms in each sec-
tor use public capital or infrastructure as a production fac-
tor. These five sectors are the non-tradable sector (services),
the importable sector (manufacturing), hydrocarbons, min-
ing and agriculture, each of which are representative at the
level of the Bolivian economy. Among these sectors, the
government views the capital-intensive hydrocarbon sec-
tor as a strategic sector that will generate the resources
needed to combat poverty and underdevelopment.
In this study, we first analyze the macroeconomic and
sectoral impacts of changes in fiscal policy such as tax
structure and public infrastructure investments on: output,
consumption, investment, the trade balance and welfare.
Second, we identify the combination of fiscal policy instru-
ments that allows the government to sustain public social
transfers to households. Third we show that the fiscal pol-
icy alone is not sufficient to generate the output growth and
welfare gains needed to reduce poverty levels, as per the
Millennium Development Goals, which indicate that GDP
per capita should grow by more than 2 percent per year.
This is equivalent to an overall GDP growth rate of more
than 6 percent per year. A combination of effective provi-
sions of public capital and increased total factor productiv-
ity (TFP) is also needed. We provide the long-run results
for each simulation along with dynamic transitions for a
handful of selected cases.
The DSGE model is based on Chumacero, Fuentes, &
Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) and is modified to include pub-
lic infrastructure investments much like Rioja (2003) and
specifically includes different exportable sectors as seen
in Estrada (2006). We calibrated the model for the Bo-
livian economy and solved it using the second-order-
approximation technique developed by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004). The advantage of this perturbation method is
that it allows for second-order effects, which feature heav-
ily in an economy with high levels of uncertainty.
An important aspect of the model is that it allows us
to derive precise quantitative information about the effects
that each scenario has on real output and welfare as well
as macroeconomic variables such as consumption, invest-
ment and output in the five sectors. The section with
the model simulation first reports the steady-state (long
run) effects then presents the dynamic effects on the com-
position of these variables. This is important if we con-
sider that, in recent years, the Bolivian government’s anti-
poverty policy has been based on transfers to households,
while it aims to use public investment as the main ap-
proach to promoting growth and welfare. Quantitative
measures of the impact of these policies are thus needed
to guide policymakers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly de-
scribes fiscal policy in Bolivia in recent years. Section 3
describes the dynamic general equilibrium model and its
1There is a rich literature on the determinants and economic outcomes of large fiscal adjustments. A non-exhaustivelist includes Ardagna (2004),
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000), Lambertini and Tavares (2000), McDermott and Wescott (1996), Von Hagen and Strauch (2001), Von Hagen,
Hughes, and Strauch (2002), among others.
2See Mauntford and Uhlig (2008), Alesina and Ardagna (2009), Cogan et.al. (2009), Ramey (2009), and Romer and Romer (2010), among others.
3Munnell (1990) and García-Milá, McGuire and Porter (1993) use panel data to estimate production elasticities.
4Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Ford and Poret (1991), Hulten (1996) and Canning (1998) among others.
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calibration for the Bolivian economy. Then, in section 4,
we present the steady-state effects for the simulation along
with the dynamic effects for selected macroeconomic and
sectoral variables. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Fiscal policy in Bolivia
The bolivian economy has recorded fiscal surpluses
since 2006, mostly due to international economic growth
which led to higher export prices for the country’s main
exports together with more revenues from the Direct Tax
on Hydrocarbons and royalties, resulting in substantially
higher public revenues. Between 2004 and 2008, govern-
ment revenues increased from 28.5 percent of GDP to 48.4
percent of GDP, a huge 20 percentage point increase in
terms of GDP.5
Figure 1 shows how these events have affected the fiscal
deficit as a percentage of GDP and how its path is closely
related to the economic growth rate. The fiscal deficit be-
gan to decline after 2002 and shifted to a surplus of 4.5 per-
cent of GDP in 2006, the highest surplus in recent years.
This fiscal balance remained positive through 2009.
Figure 1. Fiscal surplus and economic growth (in percentage
points). Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.
The economic growth rate improved in 2002-2008 and
is positively correlated with public sector fiscal results.
The economy averaged 4.8 percent annual growth over the
2004-2008 period, with growth topping out at 6.1 percent
in 2008, the highest growth since 1975. This opens up an
important question: Can these revenues be used to sustain
economic growth?
Government expenditures as a share of GDPwere fairly
steady until 2006 (aside from a slight decline in 2003) and
grew over the last 2 years of the period of analysis. Govern-
ment spending averaged 36 percent of GDP between 2000
and 2006 and rose to 42 percent and 45 percent of GDP re-
spectively in 2008 and 2009. Figure 2 shows that govern-
ment expenditures grew over these last years but was sur-
passed by revenue growth.
Figure 2. Total expenditures and revenues for the non-financial
public sector (% of GDP). Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.
Figure 3. Composition of current revenues in the non-financial
public sector (% of total). Source: UDAPE.
One explanation for the increase in government rev-
enues is ongoing increases in tax revenues. Total tax rev-
enues increased by an annual average of 27.82 percent
between 2005 and 2008. The main taxes are the Value
Added Tax (VAT) and the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons
(DTH), which together represent 50 percent of total tax rev-
enues. The DTH, a tax on hydrocarbons exports, regis-
tered the largest average increase (of 52 percent), with the
greatest increase occurring in 2006, the year that Yacimien-
tos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the national oil
company, was nationalized.
Figure 3 shows the composition of current revenues in
thenon-financial public sector. We can see that tax rev-
enues remain the main source of income, although non-tax
revenues increased after nationalization of YPFB in 2006.
Note that the hydrocarbon tax was an important source of
revenues in 2005 and 2006. In 2007 and 2008, revenues
from the hydrocarbons tax were largely replaced by non-
5A point of comparison can be made with the U.S. federal government’s fiscal revenues, which have increased by 18.7 percent of GDP over the last
40 years (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2009).
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tax revenues. Non-tax revenues also include the sale of
other public companies to domestic or foreign buyers.6
The common argument that nationalization of the oil com-
pany amounted to an additional source of public revenue
thus seems poorly founded.
Public investment was approximately 8 percent of GDP
in 2006 and 2007. It decreased to 5 percent in 2008 and then
rose to 8.5 percent of GDP in 2009. Figure 4 shows a large
concentration of public investment in infrastructure over
the last five years, the government has invested an average
of 3.8 percent of GDP in infrastructure. Social investment,
which includes investment in health, education, sanitation
and housing, ranks second in terms of public spending. It
has averaged 2 percent of GDP over the last 5 years. Public
investment in infrastructure rose with economic growth,
but social investment remained nearly unchanged. Gov-
ernment capital spending in recent years has been focused
on road and water infrastructure. While public investment
to support productive activities has been rising since 2006,
it has not returned to its 2002 share of GDP.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 (p)
Average
2005-
2008
Average
2005-
2009
Value added tax (VAT) 19.27% 21.75% 21.08% 23.24% −7.31% 21.33% 15.61%
Transactions tax (TT) 8.77% 6.32% 14.87% 23.02% −15.40% 13.25% 7.52%
Tax on profits (PT) 41.75% 38.05% 6.49% 47.18% 59.30% 33.37% 38.56%
Specific consumption tax (ICE) 18.72% 18.08% 18.87% 19.64% 5.28% 18.82% 16.12%
Complementary regime - value - added tax
(RC−IVA) 10.65% 1.23% 0.72% 18.83% 11.54% 7.86% 8.59%
Hydrocarbon’s special tax (IEHD) 64.44% 6.04% 19.15% 6.18% −29.20% 23.95% 13.32%
Financial transactions tax (FTT) 101.67% −29.49% −27.45% 5.15% −0.48% 12.47% 9.88%
Others −65.32% 8.90% 52.11% 32.29% 64.10% 6.99% 18.41%
Total Domestic Taxes 20.68% 16.63% 16.10% 24.79% 6.36% 19.55% 16.91%
Direct tax on Hydrocarbons (DTH) 136.12% 8.32% 11.57% −2.68% 52.00% 38.33%
Import tariff (GA) 18.38% 15.74% 21.31% 25.99% −16.22% 20.35% 13.04%
Total Domestic Taxes + IDH + GA 41.25% 34.10% 14.32% 21.61% 3.26% 27.82% 22.91%
Source: SIN-ANB
(p) preliminary information up to September 2009
Table 1. Tax Revenues 2004-2009 (% variation).
Figure 4. Public investment (percentage of GDP). Source: Central
Bank of Bolivia and Ministry of Economy and Public Finance.
Figure 5. Current transfers in the non-financial public sector (%
of GDP). Source: Central Bank of Bolivia.
6For example, the telecom company - Entel - was nationalized in 2008, an aviation company - BOA - was created in 2008 and Comibol, a mining
company, was reactivated in 2009.
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Bolivia’s poverty reduction strategy is entirely based
on conditional transfers to households. The amount trans-
ferred to households has increased substantially as a share
of GDP in recent years, from 0.7 percent of GDP in 2006 to
2.3 percent of GDP in 2008, as seen in figure 5.7
Finally, figure 6 shows how the fiscal deficit has been
financed in recent years. As is common in public budget
accounting, we report net external credits and net domes-
tic credits. Over the years of fiscal deficit (2000-2005), net
external credits increase until 2002 and then taper off con-
tinuously until 2006. Net domestic credits also decreased
steadily from 2002 to 2006, with substantial substitution
between foreign and domestic debt, the latter of which out-
weighed foreign-held debt by 2006. Most domestic debt is
financed by the Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) and
the Central Bank. The government has been able to reduce
its debt with the Central Bank thanks to recent fiscal sur-
pluses. Net domestic credits have thus been negative since
2006.
Figure 6. Financing of the fiscal deficit (% of GDP). Source: Cen-
tral Bank of Bolivia.
In sum, Bolivian fiscal policy is operating in a new
macroeconomic context, with increasing revenues as well
as new public sector responsibilities for state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) and policy commitments to achieve sus-
tained poverty reductions in Bolivia. Ideally, this fiscal pol-
icy should also be consistent with sustained growth and
improved welfare for the general population. These issues
will be analyzed in the following sections.
3 Modelling and calibration
3.1 The basic model
The model is based on Chumacero, Fuentes and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2004), has been modified to investigate
public infrastructure investments as in Rioja (2003) and has
been expanded further to model a multi-sector economy as
done by Estrada (2006).
3.1.1 Households
The economy in our model is comprised of infinitely-
lived individuals who derive utility from consumption
of importable goods (cm,t), consumption of non-tradable
goods (cn,t) and government consumption (gt). The last of
these is essentially a public good that is not characterized
by congestion. Representative agents thus maximizes the
expected value of lifetime utility as given by
Et
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(cm,t, cn,t, gt) (1)
The other goods produced in the economy are exportable
goods, denoted as xh for hydrocarbons (natural gas), xm
for minerals (zinc, gold, silver or tin) and xa for the agri-
cultural good (soya, Brazilian nuts or quinoa).
Each household receives interest income rk, lump-sum
transfers from the government , profits pim, pin, pixh, pixm
and pixa respectively from firms in the importable, non-
tradable, hydrocarbons, mineral and agricultural sectors8
and can also buy foreign debt abroad, b. The household’s
budget constraint is given by
(1+ τm)(1+ τc)cm,t + (1+ τc)pn,tcn,t
+ (1+ τm)(1+ τc)it + (1+ r˜t)bt ≤
(1− τk)rtkt + pixh,i+ pixm,t+
pixa,t+ pim,t + pin,t + bt+1 + Γt (2)
Where τm is an import tariff, τk is the tax rate on capital
income, τc is the tax rate on consumption of importables
and non-tradables, pn is the price of the non-tradable good
using importable goods as the numeraire and r˜ is the (net)
interest rate paid on foreign debt. Private investment, de-
noted as i, follows the standard law of motion for private
capital:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt (3)
where δ is the depreciation rate for private capital stock
and kt is the stock of private capital.
The representative household chooses cm,t, cn,t, bt+1
and kt+1. This is the same as saying that the representative
consumer’s problem can be summarized by the following
Bellman equation:
v(kt, bt) = βv(kt+1, bt+1) + u(cm,t, cn,t.gt)
− λ

cm,t + (1+ τc)pn,tcn,t + cm,t+
(1+ τc)(kt+1 − (1− δ)kt) + (1+ r˜t)bt
(1− tk)rtkt − pixh,t − pixm,t − pixa,t−
pim,t − pin,t − bt+1 − Γt
 (4)
The first-order conditions are:
pn,t =
u′cn,t
u′cm,t
(1+ τm) (5)
7There are currently three types of conditional transfers: Renta Dignidad (for persons over 60 years of age), bono Juancito Pinto (for students in
primary school) and bono Juana Azurduy (for mothers during and after pregnancy).
8Profits can be interpreted also as the remuneration to labour because we assume that labour is sector-specific.
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1 = βEt
[
u′cm,t+1
u′cm,t
(1+ r˜t+1)
]
(6)
1 = βEt
[
u′cn,t+1
u′cm,t
(
(1− τk)
(1+ τm)(1+ τc)
rt+1+1−δ
)]
(7)
Equation (5) states that the relative price between importa-
bles and non-tradables must equate marginal utilities for
each good. The intertemporal conditions are the standard
Euler equations requiring themarginal rates of substitution
between current and future consumption to be equal to the
price ratio in each of the two periods and for each good,
respectively evaluated at the cost of foreign borrowing and
the rate of return on capital investment.
3.1.2 Firms
This economy is represented by five sectors: importa-
bles (manufacturing), non-tradables (services), hydrocar-
bons, mining and agriculture. Each sector has an equal
number of representative firms which use private capital
k and public capital kg to produce their goods. Firms do
not directly own capital. Instead, they rent a quantity of
capital kt from households in each period at a rate of rt,
the domestic interest rate. Public capital is provided by the
government at no direct cost to the firm. We assume that
labour is sector specific, which means that labour cannot
move between sectors. The importable sector is actually a
domestic sector that produces import substitutes.9
Public capital is included in each sector’s production
function because the Bolivian economy is small and poor.
Any productive activity thus requires some form of gov-
ernment support. An appropriate way to capture this sit-
uation is to reflect government involvement in productive
activities through public provisions of infrastructure and
capital. The firm’s problem in this context is static, so sec-
toral profits are given by:
pim,t = (1+ τm) f (zmt, km,t, k
∗
t )− rtkm,t (8)
pin,t = pn,t f (znt, kn,t, k
∗
t )− rtkn,t (9)
pixh,t = (1+ τxh) f (zxht, kxh,t, k
∗
t )− rtkxh,t (10)
pixm,t = qxm,t f (zxmt, kxm,t, k
∗
t )− rtkxm,t (11)
pixa,t = qxa,t f (zxat, kxa,t, k
∗
t )− rtkxa,t (12)
Where pi is the representative firm’s profits in sector i, zi is
a productive shock in sector i, ki is the quantity of private
capital demanded in sector i and qi is the relative price of
good i in terms of the importable good. Public capital is the
same for all sectors. The only difference is the intensity of
public capital used in each sector. There is also a tax on the
production of hydrocarbons, denoted by τxh.
Maximizing the above profit function with respect to
the respective capital stock yields the following first-order
conditions:
(1+ τm) f
′
km(zm,t), km,t, k
∗
t = rt (13)
pn,t f
′
kn(zn,t, dn,tk
∗
t ) = rt (14)
(1− τxh)qxh,t f ′xh(zxh,t, kxh,t, h∗t ) = rt (15)
qxm,t f
′
xm(zxm,t, kxm,t, k
∗
t ) = rt (16)
qxa,t f
′
xa(zxa,t, kxa,t, k
∗
t ) = rt (17)
These equations describe the demand for capital services
by firms in each production sector of the economy.
3.1.3 Government
The volume of government infrastructure investment
is I, current public consumption expenditures are g and
lump-sum transfers to households are Γ. The govern-
ment’s budget constraint is therefore
gt + Γt + It = τc(cm,t + pn,tcn,t + it)
+ τm(1+ τc)(cm,t+ it)− τmym,t
+ τkym,t + τkrtkt + τxhqxh,tyxh,t (18)
Where ym,t is the volume of import substitutes produced
in the importables sector. The tariff rate on imports (cm,t +
it − ym,t) is m.
Public capital evolves according to the following dy-
namic:
kg,t+1 = It + (1+ δg)kg,t (19)
where 0 ≤ kg ≤ 1 is the public capital depreciation rate.
As Rioja (2003) does, we assume that the usefulness of this
capital comes in relation to its effectiveness index, given by
k∗t = θkg,t (20)
where 0 < θ < 1 is an infrastructure effectiveness index.
More efficient deployment of public capital stocks is re-
flected by a positive shift of θ towards 1, implying greater
benefits to firms.
As usual, the government does not optimize an ex-
plicit objective function. Rather, current public expendi-
tures evolve according to
gt+1 = (1− ρg)g¯+ ρggt + vg,t+1 (21)
with
vg,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2g).
3.1.4 The foreign sector
Open economies and closed economies have different
properties. When both capital and goods can be imported,
an economy with an initially low stock of capital would do
better to begin by running a current account deficit, sus-
tain a high level of consumption and pay the rest of the
9 Imports and import substitutes are perfect substitutes, which means that they should be sold at the same price. The domestic price of ym,t is thus
equal to (1+ τm).
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world later at a time of current account surplus. This ap-
proach is typically not used, making it more difficult to re-
solve models because the strategy induces multiple equi-
libria for each debt pathway and because the variables are
non-stationary.10
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) suggest five modifi-
cations to the standard model of a small open economy
with incomplete asset markets in order to achieve station-
arity. We use their modification of a debt-elastic interest-
rate premium, a strategy that has also been adopted by
Bhandari et al. (1990), Turnovsky (1997), and Osang and
Turnovsky (2000).11 This approach amounts to assuming
that the country faces an upward-sloping supply schedule
for debt, reflecting the degree of risk associated with lend-
ing to the economy. This is expressed as a borrowing rate
charged on foreign debt, r˜t+1 , which takes the form
r˜t+1 = (1− ρr)r∗ + (1− ρτ)ϕ
(
bt
yt
)ω
+ ρr r˜t + vr,t+1, ω
′ > 0, w′′ > 0 (22)
where r∗ is the exogenously given world interest rate and
ϕ(bt/yt)ω is the country-specific risk premium that in-
creases with the stock of debt as a share of output. There
are two key elements to this specification. First, the con-
vexity of the function is a convenient way to place a ceil-
ing on borrowing, as suggested by Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). Second,the form of AR(1) specification of equation
(22), which incorporates uncertainty, explains the need to
use a stochastic model. A non-stochastic model specifica-
tion would otherwise lead to the shortcoming brought up
by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000).
The relative prices of exportable goods in relation to im-
portables, i.e. the terms of trade, are assumed to follow the
law of motion given by:
qxi,t+1 = (1− ρqxi)q¯xi + ρqxiqxi,t
+ vqxi,t+1 vqxi,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2qxi
)
(23)
where q¯xi is the unconditional expectation of the terms of
trade and xh, xm and xa are the respective exportable sec-
tors.
3.1.5 Market clearing conditions
We define the general form of the production function
in each sector as:
yi,t = f (zi,t, ki,t, k
∗
t ) (24)
where i again represents each of the five sectors. Note
that the public capital k∗ is the same in each sector, which
means that infrastructure similarly benefits each sector.
Public capital is therefore a non-rival good.
Equations (25) and (26) represent the market clearing
conditions. The first equation describes the equilibrium
in the importable goods market and indicates that the cur-
rent account (CA) balance must be counterbalanced by the
capital account balance. The second equation is the typ-
ical equilibrium condition in the market for non-tradable
goods. These equations are given as
CA = −(bt+1 − bt) = qxh,tyxh,t+ qxm,tyxm,t+ qxa,tyxa,t
+ ym,t − cm,t − gt − it − It − r˜tbt (25)
and
pn,tyn,t = pn,tcn,t. (26)
3.1.6 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by the following
set of allocation rules: cm = Cm(s), cn = Cn(s), kt+1 =
K(s), bt+1 = B(s), k
∗
t+1 = K
∗(s), kxh,t+1 = Kxh(s), kxm,t+1 =
Kxm(s), kxa,t+1 = Kxa(s), km,t+1 = Km(s), knt,+1 = Kn(s);
the pricing functions r = R(s) and pn = Pn(s); and a law
of motion for the exogenous state variable s+1 = S(s), such
that:
• Households solve problem (4) taking s and the form
of the functions R(s), Pn(s), and S(s) as given. The
equilibrium solution to this problem satisfies cm =
Cm(s), cn = Cn(s), kt+1 = K(s), and bt+1 = B(s).
• Firms in the hydrocarbons, mining, agriculture, im-
portable and non-tradable sectors maximize profits
as per (13)-(17), taking s and the form of the func-
tions R(s), Pn(s), and S(s) as given. The equilibrium
solutions to these problems satisfy kxh,t+1 = Kxh(s),
kxm,t+1 = Kxm(s), kxa,t+1 = Kxa(s), km,t+1 = Km(s),
kn,t+1 = Kn(s) and k
∗
t+1 = K
∗(s).
• The economy-wide resource constraints given in (24)
and (25) hold in each period and the factor market
clears, as shown by:
Kxh(s) + Kxm(s) + Kxa(s) + Km(s) + Kn(s) = K(s).
3.2 Functional forms and calibration
A model with clearly non-linear features is difficult to
solve analytically. An alternative is to use numerical meth-
ods. We therefore adopt functional forms for the utility and
productions functions and set the model parameters as per
Bolivian macroeconomic parameters in 2006.
10See Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) for an application to the Spanish economy.
11Other modifications imply a model that has an endogenous discount factor with convex portfolio adjustment costs and complete asset markets,
and without stationarity-inducing features.
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3.2.1 Functional Forms
The generic model presented above points to the fol-
lowing functional form for preferences:
u(cm,t, cn,t, gt) = θm ln(cm,t) + θn ln(cn,t + µgt)
with θm, θn > 0 and θm + θn = 1. The parameter µ mea-
sures how a typical individual values public consumption
relative to private consumption. The specification of the
relationship between private consumption of non-tradable
goods and public consumption follows Aschauer (1985),
Barro (1981) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). We
assume that consumption of public goods can be substi-
tuted (depending on the value of µ) with consumption of
non-tradable goods and vice versa.12
We use the following specification for the production
functions:
f (zi,t, ki,t, k
∗
t ) = zi,tk
αi
i,t(k
∗
t )
φi
where αi + φi < 1 because both types of capital are fixed
factors.
The parameter αi is capital remuneration as a share of
output for sector i = xh, xm, xa, m and n, and φi is a co-
efficient indicating the importance of public capital in the
production functions in each of the five sectors in the econ-
omy.
The productivity shocks, zi, follow standard AR(1) pro-
cesses of the form:
zi,t+1 = (1− ρi)z+ ρizi,t + vi,t+1, vi,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2i ).
3.2.2 Calibration
Once the laws of motion are specified, we accurately
calibrate the model to display the main characteristics of
the Bolivian economy. We consider 2006 as our base year
and use quarterly data. We show the model parameters
in Table 2, presumed for the time being to be invariant to
changes in economic policy.
The first column of Table 2 shows the deep parameters
of preferences, i.e. parameters that will be invariant to a
particular class of interventions. The subjective discount
factor β was set consistent with the 10,66 percent annual
rate that Bolivians can borrow at (r˜ in our model). The pa-
rameters θm and θn are calibrated to reproduce total con-
sumption as a share of GDP in the steady state: we de-
fine total consumption as the sum of consumed importa-
bles and consumed non-tradables times the relative price
of this second type of consumption good. We set µ = 0.5
as a benchmark, implying imperfect substitution between
private and public consumption.
Preferences Prod. Functions
Technology
Shocks
Fiscal Variables Exogenous Prices
β = 0.975 δ = 0.028 (yearly) ρxh = 0.72 g = 0.18 qxh = 0.174
θm = 0.4585 αxh = 0.66 ρxm = 0.53 ρg = −0.083 qxm = 0.14
θn = 0.5415 αxm = 0.25 ρxa = 0.45 σg = 0.01 qxa = 0.19
µ = 0.5 αxa = 0.19 ρm = 0.4 δg = 2× δ ρqxh = 0.87
αm = 0.58 ρn = 0.51 θ = 0.613 ρqxm = 0.91
αn = 0.38 σxh = 0.014 τm = 0.1 ρqxa = 0.86
φxh = 0.25 σxm = 0.009 τc = 0.13 σqxh = 0.017
φxm = 0.14 σxa = 0.011 τk = 0.13 σqxm = 0.01
φxa = 0.12 σm = 0.017 τxh = 0.32 σqxa = 0.11
φm = 0.07 σn = 0.03 ϕ = 0.248
φn = 0.25 zxh = 0.53 ρr = 0.6576
zxm = 0.72 σr = 0.01146
zxa = 0.57 r∗ = 0.048
zm = 0.15 ω = 1.2
zn = 0.75
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 2. Parameters.
12 It is reasonable to suppose that, for example, when individuals want to increase their consumption of health services they will sacrifice consump-
tion of non-tradables such as haircuts.
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The second column describes the deep parameters of
the production functions. The depreciation rate of private
capital δ was obtained by calibrating private investment
and is set at 2.8 percent per year. The output factor elastic-
ities α in each sector were obtained by reducing the 35 sec-
tors in Bolivia’s 2006 input-output matrix to 6 sectors: agri-
culture, hydrocarbons, mining, importables, non-tradables
and infrastructure. We are particularly interested in the
following infrastructural sectors: i) energy, gas and wa-
ter, ii) transportation and storage and iii) communications.
We then use the value-added decomposition of factor pay-
ments for 1996 (the only year available) and impute these
shares for our 2006 sectoral value added. The correspond-
ing calculations are shown in table A.1 in the appendix.
The shares of infrastructure in each sector are key pa-
rameters. We have also used our input-output matrix dis-
aggregation, but here we employed the intermediate con-
sumption of infrastructure in each of the five sectors of
the model. In other words, we have calculated the value
of φ in each sector as the share of intermediate consump-
tion of infrastructure in agriculture, mining, hydrocarbons,
importables and non-tradables. Recall that public capi-
tal is presumed to be free for firms in the model, so it
seems strange to calibrate each sector’s share parameters
using intermediate consumption, which is an expenditure.
We address this concern by assuming that the government
subsidizes the private sector via public goods. The govern-
ment provides this public capital, but it is produced by the
private sector. The corresponding calculations are shown
in table A.2 of the appendix.13
The third column contains the TFP parameters. These
parameters have been calibrated to match each sector’s
share of GDP as closely as possible. The auto-regressive
coefficients and shock volatilities were set to correspond
with the autocorrelation between output and the standard
deviations of the AR(1) regression residuals for each sec-
tor’s output. 14
The fourth column shows parameters for government
and fiscal variables. The parameters of the AR(1) process
for government expenditures are taken from a simple OLS
regression, while the parameter g is calibrated to match
government expenditures as a share of GDP. The depre-
ciation rate of public capital δg has been estimated by the
World Bank at about twice that of the depreciation rate of
private capital. The benchmark effectiveness parameter θ
is estimated here using data on the so-called “loss indica-
tors”. In particular, we use the power, telecom, roads and
water loss indicators. The Bolivian loss index across all in-
frastructure types is calculated as a weighted loss and is
then compared to the weighted average in industrialized
countries. The calculations are shown in table A.3 of the
appendix. According to these calculations, Bolivia has a
level of effectiveness of 61.3, meaning that infrastructure in
Bolivia is 39 percent less effective than in developing coun-
tries.15
The Bolivian tax system is described by the various tax
rates applied across the economy. The consumption tax τc
is approximated by the 13-percentvalue added tax (VAT).
The tax on capital income τk is also levied at a rate of 13
percent and corresponds to the Complementary Regime
Value Added tax (CR-VAT). The tax on hydrocarbons τxh
is 32 percent, and is known as the Direct Tax on Hydro-
carbons (DTH). Finally, the import tariff τm represents the
average tariff for all the imported products and has a value
of 10 percent.
We display the so-called exogenous prices in column
5 of Table 3. Each of these prices follows a standard law
of motion and most of their parameters are estimated us-
ing OLS regressions. We calibrated the constant terms of
the AR(1) specifications of these relative prices using the
respective index prices calculated by the Bolivian Central
Bank. Finally, we calibrate φ as 0.248 to make the external
debt-to-GDP ratio equal 0.3790, which is consistent with
the capital account balance in the steady state. This value
for φ combined with a value of ω equal to 1.2 gives a coun-
try risk value equal to 0.05857.
4 Results
This section reports the various simulations we carried
out using the key model parameters. These simulations
quantify the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic vari-
ables such as output, consumption, investment, etc. We
also distinguish between long run effects and short run
dynamics. The long run effects are determined by com-
paring the model’s steady states in the baseline scenario
with steady states in the simulated scenarios. Determining
the effects on the short run dynamics requires that we im-
pose initial conditions, solve the model (i.e., find the policy
functions of the control variables and the endogenous state
variables’ laws of motion) and characterize the transition
to the new steady state.16
4.1 Steady state comparisons
In this subsection we present changes in the long run
steady state values for: consumption of each good (cm, cn),
physical production in each sector (Yxh,Yxa,Yxm,Ym,Yn),
13A better specification of the production function is f (zi,t, ki,t, k
∗
t ), where x represents private intermediate consumption.
14These parameter values are important for changes in the speed of convergence to the steady state.
15We use the same weights as in Rioja (2003), namely 0.40, 0.10, 0.25, 0.25 respectively for power, telecom, paved roads and water systems. The
effectiveness index θ for developing countries is normalized such that a value of 1 indicates highly effective infrastructure.
16According to our specification, the policy functions of the control variables cannot be obtained analytically, so we have to resort to numerical
methods. We used the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) second-order approximation technique. This perturbation method has proven superior to
traditional linear-quadratic approximations.
Analíti ka, Revista de análisis estadístico, 2 (2012), Vol. 4(2): 57-79 65
Carlos Gustavo Machicado y Paúl Estrada
Analíti ak
4Revista de Análisis EstadísticoJournal of Statistical Analysis
the reciprocal of the exchange rate (pn), government lump
sum transfers as a share of output (Γ, as a proxy for ad-
ditional pressures on the government budget), private in-
vestment (i), public investment (I), total real consumption
(C), total real output (Y) and equivalent variation (EV).17
The aim of this paper is to find the optimal fiscal pol-
icy in terms of growth and social transfers, which justifies
the order of the presentation of the following three subsec-
tions.
4.1.1 Tax Policy
We analyze fiscal policy solely on the basis of changes
in the rates of the four taxes considered in our model.
Simulating import tariff reductions and increases allow us
to analyze a more or less open economy. For instance,
a 0-percent tariff represents a completely open economy,
whereas a 20-percent tariff implies fewer links to the world
economy. The simulated tax change in the value added tax
scenario is an increase up to the Latin American average.
According to Otalora (2009) the Latin American average is
14.05 percent. The capital and hydrocarbon tax simulations
involve a 10-percent increase and decrease for each of these
tax rates. Table 3 displays the results of the tax policy sim-
ulations.
Notice that a fully open economy (column 1) allows
the economy to grow by 3.3 percent relative to the base-
line scenario, with welfare increasing by 3.86 percent. The
reduction in the price of the (importable) capital good in-
creases marginal productivity in the exportable and non-
tradable sectors, while this figure remains constant in the
importable sector. Therefore Yxh, Yxa, Yxm and Yn increase
andYm decreases by 0.26 percent. Consistent with the tariff
reduction, the real exchange rate depreciates by 5 percent.
The opposite effects occur when there is an increase in the
import tariff (second column). Indeed, most of the results
have a similar magnitude with the opposite sign except for
transfers as a share of GDP. Opening the economy results
in an 8.1-percent decline in transfers due to the decrease
in government revenues, whereas these transfers only in-
crease by 1.54 percent in the simulation of a more closed
economy.
Variables ∇τm ∇τm ∇τc ∇τk ∇τk ∇τxh ∇τxh ∇τm, ∇τk, ∇τxh,
∇τc ∇τc ∇τc
Simulated 0 0.2 0.1405 0.117 0.143 0.288 0.352 0, 0.117, 0.352,
value 0.1348 0.1322 0.1380
cm 6.49 −5.55 −0.51 2.28 −2.32 3.55 −3.39 6.32 2.19 −3.78
cn 2.05 −2.15 0.42 1.34 −1.41 2.25 −2.23 2.30 1.46 −1.93
Yxh 18.03 −14.85 1.02 2.47 −2.57 11.61 −10.90 18.65 2.74 −10.21
Yxa 2.03 −2.00 0.36 0.29 −0.30 0.51 −0.52 2.20 0.37 −0.27
Yxm 2.92 −2.84 0.40 0.41 −0.45 0.63 −0.69 3.13 0.50 −0.37
Ym −0.26 0.02 −0.63 2.00 −2.00 0.57 −0.59 −0.53 1.88 −1.09
Yn 2.05 −2.15 0.42 1.34 −1.41 2.25 −2.23 2.30 1.46 −1.93
pn −5.05 5.20 −0.90 0.98 −0.99 1.38 −1.28 −5.42 0.79 −1.98
Γ/GDP −8.10 1.54 17.60 −3.83 3.26 11.96 −13.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
i 6.57 −5.26 −1.23 3.58 −3.55 3.57 −3.31 6.03 3.33 −4.25
I −1.56 0.12 3.89 −0.44 0.27 3.48 −3.57 0.27 0.43 −0.72
C 4.03 −3.67 0.01 1.76 −1.81 2.83 −2.75 4.09 1.79 −2.75
Y 3.30 −3.02 0.13 1.56 −1.60 2.59 −2.51 3.41 1.61 −2.43
TU 3.86 −3.82 −0.02 1.71 −1.83 2.71 −2.79 3.91 1.73 −2.81
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 3. Change in steady-state values from a tax policy (in percentages).
17To abstract from changes in relative prices, total consumption (C) and total output (Y) are measured at the initial baseline prices. EV is defined
as the subsidy (or tax, if negative) in terms of consumption of importables, non-tradables and public services needed to compensate the consumer for
them to be indifferent between the situation before and after policy change.
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An increase in the value added tax (third column) leads
to a substantial 17.6-percent increase in transfers as a share
of GDP, but this policy does not perform well in terms of
output. Total real output increases by just 0.13 percent, the
hydrocarbons sector is the only one to grow by more than
1 percent and the importables sector even declines by 0.63
percent. Despite the endogenous increase in the lump sum
transfer, the net welfare effect is negligible (-0.02 percent).
This can largely be explained by the 0.51-percent decrease
in consumption of importables. Private investment is also
adversely affected, with a decline of 1.23 percent. As for
public investment, it increases by 3.89 percent following
the simulated increased in the value added tax.
The literature on optimal fiscal policy states that capital
taxes should be nil. Here, a reduction in the capital tax
promotes aggregate capital accumulation, which in turn
increases the amount of capital used in each sector, and
thus increases output in each sector. The sector that ben-
efits most from a reduction in capital tax is the hydrocar-
bons sector which sees a 2.47 percent increase in output.
This happens because the hydrocarbons sector is intensive
in capital (α larger than 0.5). Manufacturing (importables),
the other capital-intensive sector, grows by 2 percent. No-
tice that the effects of an increase or a decrease in the capi-
tal tax are almost linear. When the tax on capital increases
by 10 percent, aggregate output decreases by 1.6 percent
as opposed to an increase of 1.56 percent when the capital
tax decreases by 10 percent. Production in the hydrocar-
bons sector is highly sensitive to variations in the tax on
the production in this sector. Notice that a 10-percent de-
crease in this tax increases output in this sector by 11.61
percent, while in the opposing simulation it decreases by
10.9 percent. What is interesting to observe in this simu-
lation is that government revenues rise due to a significant
increase in output in the hydrocarbons sector. Even though
the tax rate is lowered (column 6), transfers as a share of
GDP rise by 11.96 percent, which is similar in scale to the
increase in output in the hydrocarbons sector. Consump-
tion of tradable and non-tradable goods is also positively
affected, allowing the government to collect more revenue
via the consumption tax.18
Finally, the last three columns of Table 4 show our simu-
lation of three combined scenarios, with transfers as a share
of GDPmaintained at its level in the baseline scenario. This
is to analyze the increase in consumption or value added
tax required to compensate for the negative effects of tax
policies which reduce transfers as a share of GDP.
Among the three combined scenarios, the best scenario
combines a completely open economy (τm = 0) with a 3.72-
percent increase in the value added tax. The scenario that
combines a decrease in the capital tax with an increase in
the value added tax is also good in the sense that the im-
pact on all variables is positive, albeit limited, whereas the
scenario that combines an increase in the hydrocarbons tax
with an increase in the value added tax is undesirable be-
cause all variables are negatively impacted.
From these simulations, we can conclude that, in terms
of a tax policy, in Bolivia the best it is to liberalize the econ-
omy by reducing tariffs. This policy allows the economy
to grow by 3.3 percent and to experience welfare gains of
3.86 percent. If the government also wishes to maintain its
social policy based on transfers to households, it should
finance this policy by an increase in the value added tax.
This combined policy allows the economy to grow by 3.41
percent and to experience welfare gains of 3.91 percent rel-
ative to the baseline.
4.1.2 Expenditure and investment policy
Next, we analyze a fiscal policy based solely on public
expenditures and public investment. Recall that in our set-
ting, public consumption includes everything other than
investment. This means that health and education expen-
ditures are included in this variable, as are expenditures
such as wages and benefits for public workers. First, we
simulate a 10-percent increase in public expenditures. Sec-
ond, we simulate an increase in public investment as a
share of total government revenues. We simulate an in-
crease of this share that is equal to the average increase
over 2007 and 2008. Finally, we combine a 10-percent in-
crease in public expenditures with a 10-percent increase in
public investments.
People typically expect that an increase in government
expenditures or public investments positively affects out-
put. Cross-country empirical studies have generally found
that public infrastructure positively affects a country’s out-
put (e.g, Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Canning and Fay
(1993), Canning (1999)). This holds true for the case of
Bolivia. A 3.26-percent increase in public investment as a
share of government revenues (the average over the last
two years) respectively increases output and public invest-
ment by 1.58 percent and 5.19 percent. However, the op-
posite happens when the government increases its current
expenditures. A 10-percent increase in government expen-
ditures leads to a 1.86-percent decline in output and a 3.56-
percent decline in consumption. An increase in govern-
ment expenditure certainly weighs on the fiscal balance,
given that transfers as a share of GDP have to be reduced
by 51.55 percent.
The combined scenario shows that transfers to house-
holds are very sensitive to an increase in government ex-
penditures: they largely decrease, whereas aggregate out-
put, consumption and investment show positive signs. In
particular, public investment increases substantially, by
11.69 percent. In the first and third columns, it can also
be seen that the real exchange rate depreciates, although
this depreciation only positively affects outputs in the ex-
portable sectors in the combined scenario. In the case
18See Chamley (1986) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) for references on optimal fiscal policy.
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where only government expenditure increases, the nega-
tive sign on all sectoral outputs can be explained in relation
to reduced public investment, which affects public capital
and thus output in every sector.
The results show that the government should choose
a public investment policy over a public expenditure pol-
icy. This result itself points to another question: If edu-
cation and health are considered as elements of variable
g, does this mean that it is bad for the government to in-
crease these expenditures? This question will be answered
in the following exercises. The results in Table 5 indicate
that a 25-percent increase in the consumption tax is needed
to completely compensate for the negative effects that a 10-
percent increase in government expenditures has on trans-
fers as a share of GDP. This huge increase negatively affects
growth, consumption, private investment and welfare. In
fact, only public investment reacts positively, with an in-
crease of 6.95 percent.
Variables ∆g ∆I/Yg ∆g,∆I/Yg
Simulated value 0.198 0.2756 0.198, 0.2936
cm −4.36 1.31 −0.41
cn −2.92 1.80 2.52
Yxh −2.95 3.68 8.22
Yxa −0.61 0.76 1.66
Yxm −0.79 0.95 2.09
Ym −0.69 0.85 1.86
Yn −2.92 1.80 2.52
pn −2.06 −0.41 −3.17
Γ/GDP −51.55 1.49 −45.02
i −2.38 1.37 1.76
I −4.12 5.19 11.69
C −3.56 1.58 1.21
Y −1.86 1.58 2.90
TU −3.38 1.51 1.33
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 4. in steady-state values from an expenditure and investment policy (in percentages).
The second column presents the scenario where we
combine a 10-percent increase in government expenditures
with an increase in the value added tax (up to the Latin
American average) and a decrease in the hydrocarbons tax.
We find this to be a better policy, with all variables react-
ing positively. Of particular interest is that long run output
grows by 5.48 percent compared to the baseline scenario,
the best growth result observed for any simulation seen
yet. This important impact is surely driven by the 30.88-
percent increase in output in the hydrocarbons sector, the
main sector of the Bolivian economy.
4.1.3 Tax and expenditure policy
We can begin to answer the previous question by com-
bining the 10-percent increase in government expenditures
with an increase in the two main taxes that the Bolivian
government can change: the value added tax and the
hydrocarbons tax. In particular we aim to calculate the
change in tax rates required to compensate for the nega-
tive effect that government expenditures has on transfers
to households.
4.1.4 Fiscal policy together with improved efficiency
and productivity
In this subsection we analyze fiscal policy together with
two variables which are not directly related to fiscal policy
but which can be incentivized by the government. These
other two variables are efficiency, which pertains to im-
provements in the way public investment (in infrastruc-
ture) is provided, and productivity, i.e., improved total fac-
tor productivity across all sectors.
According to the 2006-2011National Development Plan
(the PND, in Spanish), Bolivia should have attained av-
erage annual output growth of 6.3 percent. This overall
growth was expected to come via annual growth of 3.1 per-
cent in agriculture, 6.8 percent for importables, 18.8 per-
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cent for non-tradables, 13.2 percent for hydrocarbons and
10.4 percent in mining. We have re-calibrated the TFP pa-
rameters in each sector to obtain these growth rates in the
respective sectors. As we are using quarterly data, the
TFP parameters have been calibrated for quarterly rates of
growth.19
Variables ∆g,∆τc ∆g,∆τc and∇τxh
Simulated value 0.198, 0.1627 0.198, 0.1405 and 0.2328
cm −6.14 5.12
cn −2.00 3.68
Yxh −0.50 30.88
Yxa 0.34 1.08
Yxm 0.30 1.32
Ym −2.77 0.18
Yn −2.00 3.68
pn −4.75 1.11
Γ/GDP 0.00 0.00
i −6.29 6.53
I 6.95 9.09
C −3.85 4.32
Y −1.74 5.48
TU −3.77 4.30
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 5. Change in steady-state values from a tax and expenditure policy (in percentages).
Rioja (2003) shows that raising public capital effective-
ness has large and positive effects on private investment,
consumption and welfare. We simulated a 5-percent in-
crease in the effectiveness level of the existing infrastruc-
ture network. This increases the value of θ to 0.644. The
first two columns in table 6 show the effects of increasing
TFP and θ, while the next columns show five combined
policy scenarios which give information on the best fiscal
policy for the Bolivian government to follow.
Comparing columns 1 and 2, we can see that both
changes positively impact the economy. Public and pri-
vate investment are affected similarly, while consumption
increases more when there is an increase in TFP, leading to
a larger increase in output (5.16 percent). The favourable
productivity boost lifts output in the non-tradable sector by
6.67 percent, while the increase in effectiveness has a larger
impact on output in the hydrocarbons sector, which rises
by 6.35 percent relative to the baseline. Welfare gains are
also larger in the TFP simulation than in the effectiveness
simulation, while the magnitudes of the increase of trans-
fers as a share of GDP are similar in both scenarios. A key
conclusion here is that productivity and effectiveness are
important sources of growth, but need to be accompanied
by fiscal policy to reach higher growth rates.
We combine productivity and effectiveness with gov-
ernment expenditures in the third and fourth columns. We
combine a 10-percent increase in government expenditures
with an increase in TFP in all sectors. The results show that
expansionary fiscal policy based on the increase in current
expenditure only increases output by 2.34 percent, while
transfers as a share of GDP fall by 36.61 percent. If we
add a 5-percent increase in θ, transfers as a share of GDP
still decrease by 21.42 percent, but output grows at a much
more satisfactory rate of 5.3 percent. These results indicate
that an increase in the effectiveness of public infrastructure
can enhance growth. The question is: How much does the
effectiveness index need to increase by for the government
to break the trade-off between transfers (social policy) and
growth.20
The fifth column shows that the effectiveness index
must increase by 12.47 percent to 0.69 tomaintain the social
policy. Furthermore, output grows by 9.71 percent, which
19The PND presents the economic and planning strategy that the government will follow over the coming years to consolidate the process of
transforming the economy.
20 We do not consider a larger increase in TFP because this is more difficult to achieve. TFP is related to many things in the economy, but it is not
directly related to fiscal policy and only improves over time.
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is an appropriate growth rate for a country that needs to
reduce its level of poverty. Private and public investment
also benefit substantially, respectively by 7.25 percent and
9.42 percent. Welfare also rises by 8.97 percent, which is
primary explained by the 12.67-percent increase in con-
sumption of non-tradable goods.
Important and sizable effects can be seen when the in-
crease in TFP is omitted, although the effects are smaller.
Total real output increases by 8.05 percent, welfare gains
are in the order of 7.23 percent and total real consumption
rises by 7.81 percent. Lump sum transfers remain constant
because the effectiveness index increased by 17.7 percent.
Variables ∆TFP ∆θ ∆g,∆TFP
∆g,∆TFP
and ∆θ
∆g,∆TFP
and ∆θ
∆g, ∆θ
∆g,∆I/Yg
and ∆θ
Simulated value (*) 0.644 0.198, (*)
0.198, (*) and
0.644
0.198, (*) and
0.69
0.198, 0.721
0.198, 0.2936
and 0.7
cm 3.29 3.04 −1.06 2.08 6.76 6.33 9.54
cn 6.67 3.40 3.67 7.29 12.67 9.00 13.70
Yxh 4.75 6.35 1.76 8.31 18.38 19.72 30.50
Yxa 1.27 1.29 0.68 1.98 3.88 3.81 5.69
Yxm 3.10 1.61 2.32 4.01 6.45 4.82 7.21
Ym 2.04 1.46 1.36 2.85 5.00 4.29 6.43
Yn 6.67 3.40 3.67 7.29 12.67 9.00 13.70
pn −2.89 −0.20 −4.82 −4.96 −5.15 −2.49 −3.51
Γ/GDP 13.06 13.80 −36.61 −21.42 0.00 0.00 0.00
i 2.90 2.63 0.52 3.22 7.25 6.82 10.42
I 3.70 3.80 −0.42 3.50 9.42 9.32 25.75
C 5.16 3.24 1.56 4.96 10.03 7.81 11.84
Y 4.23 2.83 2.34 5.30 9.71 8.05 12.27
TU 4.72l 3.06 1.60 4.70 8.97 7.23 10.46
Source: Author’s calculations
Note: (*) The percentage increases are 0.6 (tradables), 4.3 (non-tradables), 0.71 (hydrocarbons), 1.8 (mining) and 0.6 (agriculture).
Table 6. Steady-state changes: fiscalpolicy with improved effectiveness and TFP.
Unfortunately, there is no available metric to determine
whether this magnitude is relatively big or small. Rioja
(2003) calculates θ as equal to 0.74, the average across seven
Latin American countries. Taking this value as a bench-
mark, we can say that the country will be able to develop
a fiscal policy using public expenditures without affecting
either growth or its social policy if it can approximate this
number. This is a new finding because it shows links be-
tween effectiveness in the provision of public infrastruc-
ture, public expenditures (health and education) and social
policy (transfers to households).
In the last column, we simulate a 10-percent increase in
public investment as a share of government revenues. This
reduces the required increase in effectiveness and is the
best case scenario for Bolivia. All the main macroeconomic
variables jump bymore than 10 percent. Public investment
is notable in this regard, with arise of 25.75 percent. This re-
sult shows the importance of public investment, alongwith
the associated measure of effectiveness as emphasized by
Rioja (2003).
Latin American countries which have experienced an
increase in TFP are those which have been able to reduce
their growth gap with developed countries such as the US
or UK. Our model demonstrates that this reduction in the
growth gap could also happen for Bolivia if the country
begins to dismantle the various restrictions and distortions
that impede improved productivity. Long run economic
growth can be improved by enhancing TFP growth. In Bo-
livia, however, there is also plenty of scope for public in-
frastructure and spending policies, particularly if they are
accompanied by a healthy measure of effectiveness. This
combination of more, and more effective, spending will
certainly help poverty reduction and sectoral economic
growth, and will thus also help solve other problems like
unemployment and underused capacity.21
21See Restuccia (2008) for an excellent explanation of how low output per worker in Latin America is due to a low and declining relative TFP.
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4.2 Impact and dynamic transition effects
In the long run, we model changes in fiscal and non-
fiscal policies as permanent changes in the tax rates levied
on different sectors or asmultiplicative shocks on their pro-
duction functions. In order to quantify the long run level
effects of these policies, we thus focus on comparisons be-
tween two steady states.
Three issues are overlooked in the long run analysis:
First, the nature of fiscal policy implies gradual rather than
instantaneous changes in macroeconomic variables. Sec-
ond, time timing of policy implementation must be consid-
ered when evaluating potential costs and benefits of pol-
icy changes because initial conditions are very different
from steady-state conditions. Finally, the structure of the
economy determines the speed of convergence to the new
steady state and the transitional dynamics.
Let s0 be the initial values of the state variables (cali-
brated to replicate the Bolivian economy in 2006). Let Gi(·)
be the policy functions of the control variables and Si(·)
the implied laws of motion of the state variables for the
baseline scenario B and the comparisons scenarios C1 and
C2. Using the policy functions, the laws of motion and the
initial conditions, dynamic simulations are carried out for
every variable of interest. The dynamic simulations show
how long it takes to reach the percentage changes caused
by the combination of a 10-percent increase in government
expenditures and public investment as a share of govern-
ment revenues together with a 15.44-percent increase in the
effectiveness of public capital (last column of table 6). This
is our C1 scenario presented in the following table and in
figure B1 in the appendix.
Recall that we concluded in the previous section that
the best strategy the Bolivian government can adopt is to
increase government expenditures and public investment.
This is particularly true if the strategy is accompanied by
an increase in the effectiveness of public capital to compen-
sate for negative effects that higher current expenditures
have on transfers to households. The most notable varia-
tions were in relation to output, consumption and welfare,
each of which increase by more than 10 percent. These re-
sults are for the long run, however, and we don’t know
how long it would take to reach these long run steady-state
values.
The results in table 7 show that the macroeconomic
variables and sectoral outputs approach their steady state
values after 160 years. That is far too long and the results
can be even more disappointing if we consider that output
will only be 6.6-percenthigher than the baseline scenario
after 20 years, while welfare will only have improved by
4.5 percent over this period of time. After 5 years, Bolivia
will be growing at its historical level of about 4 percent.
These disappointing results lead us to analyze the C2
scenario where we added the productivity boost as per
the PND goals. This increase in overall TFP leads to
much higher steady-state values, and appropriate short
run growth rates as shown in the following table and in
figure B2 in the appendix.22
Years
Variable 1 5 10 20 40 80 160 SS
Output 3.0% 3.8% 4.8% 6.6% 9.1% 11.3% 12.2% 12.3%
Consumption 0.7% 1.6% 2.7 4.7% 7.8% 10.6% 11.7% 11.8%
Priv. Investment 1.5% 4.2% 6.5% 9.0% 10.4% 10.5% 10.4% 10.4%
Pub. Investment 20.3% 20.4% 20.7% 21.6% 23.3% 25.0% 25.7% 25.7%
Welfare 0.8% 1.6% 2.6% 4.5% 7.1% 9.5% 10.4% 10.5%
Years
Sector 1 5 10 20 40 80 160 SS
Hydrocarbons 9.6% 11.9% 14.4% 18.5% 23.8% 28.5% 30.3% 30.5%
Agriculture 2.1% 2.6% 3.1% 3.8% 4.7% 5.4% 5.7% 5.7%
Mining 2.6% 3.2% 3.8% 4.8% 5.9% 6.8% 7.2% 7.2%
Importables 1.2% 1.4% 1.7% 2.6% 4.1% 5.7% 6.3% 6.4%
Non-tradables 2.7% 3.8% 5.1% 7.2% 10.0% 12.6% 13.6% 13.7%
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 7. Dynamic transition - expansive fiscal policy + effectiveness of public capital.
22By appropriate growth rates, we refer to the 2% GDP per capita growth required to reduce poverty levels.
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Years
Variable 1 5 10 20 40 80 160 SS
Output 5.3% 6.4% 7.7% 10.0% 13.2% 16.0% 17.1% 17.2%
Consumption 3.1% 4.5% 6.0% 8.7% 12.6% 16.3% 17.7% 17.8%
Priv. Investment 3.5% 7.2% 9.7% 12.4% 13.8% 13.9% 13.8% 13.8%
Pub. Investment 23.5% 23.7% 24.2% 25.4% 27.6% 29.7% 30.6% 30.7%
Welfare 2.9% 4.2% 5.5% 7.8% 10.9% 13.7% 14.7% 14.8%
Years
Sector 1 5 10 20 40 80 160 SS
Hydrocarbons 10.4% 13.5% 16.6% 21.7% 28.5% 34.4% 36.7% 36.9%
Agriculture 2.7% 3.3% 3.9% 4.8% 5.8% 6.7% 7.0% 7.1%
Mining 4.8% 5.6% 6.4% 7.5% 9.0% 10.1% 10.5% 10.6%
Importables 1.8% 2.1% 2.6% 3.8% 5.8% 7.8% 8.5% 8.6%
Non-tradables 7.2% 8.6% 10.2% 13.0% 16.7% 20.0% 21.3% 21.4%
Source: Author’s calculations
Table 8. Dynamic transition − expansive fiscal policy + more effective public capital + higher TFP.
Table 8 shows that the Bolivian economy can attain high
rates of output and private investment growth over a 5-
year time frame, respectively of 6.4 percent and 7.2 percent.
The economy performs even better in these respects over a
10-year time frame as well and reaches its highest point
with respect to the baseline after 20 years. It is important
to note that a moderate increase in TFP, as per the simu-
lation that followed the PND targets, may have important
medium run effects on growth and welfare. If we want to
increase the short run impact, however, a larger boost in
TFP is needed.
In conclusion, fiscal policy on its own does im-
prove economic performance. Achieving sufficiently good
macroeconomic performance across sectors to substan-
tially impact Bolivia’s trajectory with respect to poverty
will be best achieved together with efficient provision of
public capital and more substantial productivity growth.23
5 Concluding remarks
Bolivia has experienced a substantial increase in for-
eign revenues due to a substantial commodity boom. This
export boom has allowed the country to reverse chronic
fiscal and external deficits and to accumulate more for-
eign exchange reserves than even before (USD 7.7 billion
in 2008 and USD 8.5 billion in 2009). Average growth rates
of 5.2 percent over the last four years did more for Bolivian
economic growth than the three preceding decades, which
puts the country in an excellent position to reduce poverty.
Government revenue has increased by nearly 20 per-
centage points of GDP over the last four years. Much of
this rise is due to an increase in royalties collected, rena-
tionalization of the industry and the historically high inter-
national oil prices. This unprecedented scenario allowed
the government to push forward fiscal policy via expen-
diture and investment policies and to implement several
transfer programs for poor people.
This study simulated the macroeconomic and sectoral
impacts of various fiscal policy scenarios by building a
five-sector dynamic general equilibrium model for a small
open economy. The economy is inhabited by representa-
tive infinitely-lived agents who face upward-sloping for-
eign capital supply as a reflection of an endogenous coun-
try risk premium. We also include public capital as a pro-
duction factor for private production, allowing us to ana-
lyze the impact of public infrastructure investment on sec-
toral outputs. Public capital is nonrival and we find that it
substantially aids growth and welfare. The model has been
calibrated to match the national account ratios and sectoral
output of the Bolivian economy using 2006 as the base year.
The simulation results for the steady states shows that
the best fiscal policy is a 3.71-percent increase in the value
added tax together with an open economy. This policy al-
lows the economy to grow by 3.41 percent and to maintain
current social transfers to households. We then analyzed
fiscal policies involving increased government spending
and public investment. The results are notable, in that
macroeconomic constraints imply that government expen-
23In appendix C, we also performed a sensitivity analysis for the relative prices and the valuation of public consumption.
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ditures strongly and negatively affect transfers to house-
holds. This negative effect reduces consumption of trad-
ables and non-tradables, depressing aggregate demand.
As for public investment, it positively affects the econ-
omy by strengthening production in all sectors, although
growth and welfare gains are low.
These results are controversial, first because they indi-
cate that this combination of policies does not allow the
economy to surpass the 6-percent minimum growth rate
required to reduce poverty and second, because it seems
that public expenditure policies are not good for the econ-
omy. In order to investigate this situation we analyzed
several combined scenarios. The results show that vari-
ousmacroeconomic indicators improve substantially when
a 10-percent increase in government expenditures is com-
bined with an increase the value added tax up to the Latin
American average and a 27.2-percent decrease in the hy-
drocarbons tax. This policy situation allows the economy
to grow by 5.48 percent, with 30.9-percent growth in the
hydrocarbons sector being the main driver behind this re-
sult.
The results remain far from ideal when analyzing the
steady-state, i.e., the long-run effects. The analysis is then
complemented by simulation of TFP productivity boosts
across all sectors together with more effective provisions
of public capital. We found that the best combination of
fiscal policy instruments is the following: a 10-percent in-
crease in government expenditures and public investment
and a 15.4-percent increase in the effectiveness index of
public capital. This combination allows the government to
sustain social transfer policies and the economy grows by
12.3 percent in the long run. An additional increase in TFP
as per the PND (National Development Plan) goals would
allow the economy to grow by a further 17.2 percent and
transfers to be increased by 13.7 percent.
Finally, we simulated the dynamic transition paths for
these two noteworthy scenarios to look into another impor-
tant question: How long does it take the economy to reach
these steady states? It takes more than 100 years, but there
are also important effects in the medium run, particularly
in terms of productivity increases. In 5 years, output can
grow by an additional 6.4 percent, consumption rises by
6 percent and private investment increases by 9.7 percent.
After 10 years output grows by 7.7 percent and output is
10 percent higher in the 20-year timeframe. In conclusion,
larger productivity boosts are needed to promote growth
and welfare in the short-run.
The paper analyzed fiscal policy in Bolivia in an effort
to guide the decisions that a government will have to take
if it wants to use fiscal policy as the primary tool to pro-
mote development and structural transformations of the
Bolivian economy. The results should come as no surprise.
Fiscal policy alone is unable to generate growth rates: it
has to be accompanied by productivity boosts in every sec-
tor and public capital should also be deployed more effec-
tively. Improving TFP performance may not necessarily be
within the scope of fiscal policy, or perhaps there is a role
for the government by removing distortions from produc-
tion sectors.
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APPENDIX
A Calibrations
Table A.1. Calibration of φ
1 2 3 4 5
Sectors
Agriculture
(1-5)
Hydrocarbons
(6 y 19)
Mining (7, 20,
21 y 22)
Importables
(8-18 y 23)
Non-tradables
(25, 26 y 29-35)Intermediate Consumption
(thousands of 1990Bs.)
Agriculture 673,280 1,903 16,516 3,633,472 196,011
Hydrocarbons 37,740 1,171,274 106,898 154,590 187,431
Mining 31,698 162,272 585,708 574,910 1,022,309
Importables 528,444 88,162 257,327 2,823,865 2,331,561
Non-tradables 128,294 369,308 57,827 260,887 1,008,874
Electricity, gas and water 322 52,109 50,813 89,587 169,092
Transport and storage 186,842 534,921 102,381 403,240 1,161,924
Communications 1,781 3,935 18,218 66,670 235,227
Total 1,588,400 2,383,885 1,195,688 8,007,221 6,312,428
Infrastructure 188,944 590,965 171,412 559,497 1,566,243
φs 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.07 0.25
Input-output matrix (2006)
Table A.2. Calibration of θ
Year Power (i)
Telecom
(ii)
Paved
Roads (iii)
Water (iv)
1995 11.56 n.a. 94.50 n.a.
1996 11.49 n.a. 94.50 n.a.
1997 11.61 n.a. 94.30 n.a.
1998 11.99 n.a. 94.00 n.a.
1999 11.41 n.a. 93.60 n.a.
2000 10.18 n.a. 93.40 n.a.
2001 12.40 n.a. 93.30 n.a.
2002 13.07 n.a. 93.30 n.a.
2003 14.35 n.a. 93.00 n.a.
2004 13.61 n.a. 93.00 n.a.
2005 13.95 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2006 14.36 n.a. n.a. 37.03
2007 n.a. 17.76 n.a. 31.97
2008 n.a. n.a. n.a. 32.87
(i) Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output)
(ii) Faults (per 100 mainlines per year)
(iii) Roads, not paved (% of total roads)
(iv) Losses (% of total water provision)
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B Dynamic Transitions
Figure B.1. Baseline Scenario vs. C1 Figure B.2. Baseline scenario vs. C2
C Sensitivity Analysis
In this appendix we analyze how sensitive the model’s
main results are to changes in the valuation of public con-
sumption and/or relative prices. In particular, we simulate
the effects on output growth and welfare gains as:
• Changes in the value of public consumption. Pub-
lic consumption is related to consumption of non-
tradables by the parameter µ. We simulate an in-
crease in µ to 1. This represents a situation where
consumers weight public and private consumption
equally, as opposed to a decrease in µ to 0, where
public consumption is pure waste.
• Change in relative prices (qxh, qxa and qxm). The Boli-
vian Central Bank has computed these relative prices
for the basic exportable products of Bolivia. Accord-
ing to these calculations, we simulate a 10-percent in-
crease and decrease in the three prices.
The following figures display the results:
Figure C.3
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Cavalcanti and Goncalvez (2006) also perform a sen-
sitivity analysis and find no problems when using values
of µ between 0 and 1, although Evans and Karras (1996)
have estimated a value of µ equal to 1.14 using a GMM es-
timator. We observe that when public consumption is pure
waste (µ = 0) the GDP growth rate is above 1 percent, but
welfare gains are negative. As we increase the parameter
towards 1, the rate of growth tends to decrease andwelfare
gains tend to increase. It is also interesting to observe that
the welfare gains are sizeable when public consumption is
equally valued to private consumption (when µ = 1).This
happens because we consider public consumption as part
of the utility function. Recall again that public consump-
tion includes government expenditures on health and ed-
ucation. These last results suggest that if human capital
were more highly valued in Bolivia (through more spend-
ing on health and education), the economy would benefit
from positive welfare gains even if output growth is held
back.
The results of the exercises with commodity prices (rel-
ative prices) show that output and welfare are positively
correlatedwith those prices, particularly for hydrocarbons.
A 10-percent increase in hydrocarbon prices relative to the
baseline can lead to output and welfare gains of nearly 15
percent. Changes in agriculture and mining prices have
similar effects on growth and welfare.
Figure C.4 Figure C.5
Figure C.6
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